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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2497
___________
YI JING GROEBER,
Appellant
v.
FRIEDMAN AND SCHUMAN, P.C.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:13-cv-00111)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 12, 2014
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 12, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Yi Groeber appeals pro se from the District Court’s judgment entered in favor of
the defendants. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.

In January 2013, Yi Groeber filed a complaint against her former employer,
Friedman and Schuman, P.C. (“FSA”), alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000
et seq. Groeber claims, in particular, that FSA discriminated against her on the basis of
race and retaliated against her for complaining of discrimination. Her allegations are as
follows.
Groeber, an Asian American woman, applied for a legal secretary position with
FSA. She was told by FSA’s office manager, Stephen DeMaio, that the position was not
available but that there was an opening for a support clerk position. On May 1, 2006,
Groeber accepted the position after DeMaio assured her that “there are always
opportunities [to be promoted].” Despite DeMaio’s assurance, she was excluded from
every possible promotion opportunity. For instance, a new secretary position was
created, but Groeber, who at the time had three years of secretarial experience, was
disqualified because the position required a minimum of five years of experience. The
applicant ultimately selected—a white woman—had only one year of experience. During
her employment at FSA, Groeber expressed an interest in temporarily taking on
secretarial duties whenever one of FSA’s secretaries took a leave of absence, but she was
rebuffed, and instead FSA would always hire temporary staff—always white women.
Groeber’s dissatisfaction came to a head on March 16, 2007. DeMaio
reprimanded her for assisting one of FSA’s attorneys because she had already been
forbidden on several previous occasions from doing so. An argument ensued in which
Groeber told DeMaio and the attorney that she felt discriminated against. Thereafter,
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DeMaio locked Groeber out of the computer system and told her to go home. When
Groeber returned to work on Monday to discover that she was still locked out of the
computer system, she contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Groeber contacted the EEOC again on May 10, 2007, because she remained
locked out of the system. FSA terminated Groeber’s employment on June 8, 2007.
The District Court granted FSA’s motion to dismiss Groeber’s complaint, after
holding a hearing. The District Court determined that Groeber failed to sufficiently
allege a claim of racial discrimination and unlawful retaliation. Groeber timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order dismissing Groeber’s complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, Groeber’s complaint needed to
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race,
a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified
for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse
employment action was made under circumstances that give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination. Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam). To survive a motion to dismiss, Groeber did not need to
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establish the elements of a prima facie case; she merely needed to “put forth allegations
that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
element[s].” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
As the District Court correctly concluded, Groeber failed to put forth facts to
support the fourth element above. In her complaint, Groeber alleged chiefly that FSA
hired less qualified white women for secretarial positions and that she never received a
raise while others who had been employed more recently did. Groeber’s subjective belief
that race played a role in these employment decisions, however, is not sufficient to
establish an inference of discrimination; rather, discrimination may be inferred by
showing FSA treated similarly situated employees outside of Groeber’s class more
favorably. Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999).
Without proof that someone similarly situated was treated more favorably, Groeber is left
only with her subjective belief that race played a role in FSA’s employment decisions.
She presents no discriminatory statements by FSA or evidence of discriminatory motive
to support her allegations.
Moreover, Groeber offered no rebuttal to FSA’s proffered (performance-related)
reason for terminating her employment. In fact, Groeber conceded that she had been
given oral warnings, and at least one written evaluation reflected that her job performance
was a mix of average and fair. (See Hr’g Tr., 27, April 26, 2013.)
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Groeber’s retaliation claim likewise fails. She alleged that FSA retaliated against
her by terminating her employment because she had complained of discrimination. The
viability of Groeber’s retaliation claim is contingent on a finding that (1) she engaged in
protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
The problem with Groeber’s retaliation claim lies with the element of causation.
She suggested that the temporal proximity between her complaint to DeMaio on March
16, 2007, and her termination on June 8, 2007, demonstrates a causal connection between
the two events. Indeed, temporal proximity can be probative of a causal connection in
retaliation cases. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir.
2000). But the “mere fact that adverse employment action occurs after a complaint will
ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link
between the two events.” Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006). The timing must be “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive before a
causal link will be inferred. Krouse v. American Sterilizer, Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d
Cir. 1997). The three-month period between the time Groeber complained to DeMaio
and the time she was fired is not “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive. See, e.g.,
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (citing cases where three
and four months between protected activity and adverse employment action was
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insufficient to establish a causal connection); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police
Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding two months between protected activity
and adverse employment action not unduly suggestive). Nor did Groeber allege that
anything otherwise nefarious occurred between the time she complained to DeMaio and
the time her employment was terminated. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504 (“When temporal
proximity between protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct is missing, courts
may look to the intervening period for other evidence of retaliatory animus.).
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Groeber’s motion to expedite this appeal is denied as moot.
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